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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of the anti-corruption campaign on the investment behavior of Chinese
politically connected firms between 2007and 2016. The results indicate that the campaign impacts on the
investment expenditures and investment efficiency of Chinese listed firms. Compared with the precampaign period, all types of politically connected firms experience an obvious reduction in investment
expenditures and SOEs controlled by local governments and Non-SOEs face enhanced investment
efficiency after the campaign. Further analysis shows that it is mainly due to the mitigation of
underinvestment for SOEs controlled by local governments and the alleviation of both over-investment and
underinvestment for Non-SOEs.5
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1. INTRODUCTION
Political connections are widespread all around the world, especially in developing countries
where institutions are less well-established, and regulations and laws are weak. Under such
circumstances, to “get things done”, firms have to build connections with bureaucratic officials.
However, this could hinder economic development. As a result, a number of countries took action
to try to deal with this problem and China is a very noticeable case among them. Shortly after
taking the position of the president of China, on December 4, 2012, Xi Jin-Ping announced a new
“Eight-point Policy” which limits state-owned enterprises (hereafter, SOEs) top managers’ scope
for extracting private benefits and curtails officials accepting private benefits from others (Lin et
al., 2017). This is so-called “anti-corruption campaign (hereafter, the campaign)”.
After this campaign was implemented, researchers began to examine the effects of the campaign
on Chinese listed firms. Griffin et al. (2016) study the effects of the campaign and document an
overall reduction in measures of potential corporate self-dealing, suggesting that the campaign has
changed Chinese corporate culture. Then some other researchers such as Ke et al. (2016), Lin et
al. (2017) and Liu et al. (2017) investigate the effect of the campaign on stock prices. However,
the stock price reaction indicates the perceptions of the future, not the future itself (Ross et al.,
2015). The influence of the campaign on investment activity, a critical factor affecting firms’ goal
of maximizing shareholder wealth, is still unexplored. This study, therefore, fills this void by
examining the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on investment behavior. In addition, little
previous research investigates the influence of the loss of politically connected independent
directors on corporate investment activity. This study thus also investigates this issue by separating
the political-connected firms into independent director-connected and non- independent directorconnected subgroups to determine if the campaign effects are mainly driven by politically
connected independent directors and/or by other political linkages.
Chinese listed firms are studied due to the following reasons: first, with a population of 1.3 billion,
China is the second largest economy and the largest emerging market in the world nowadays. It
has also been the largest contributor to world growth since the global financial crisis of 2008
(World Bank, 2017). Second, in China, governments control the allocation of resources and
because of this, firms, especially Non-SOEs, build political connections to overcome difficulties
such as fundraising. Previous research proposes that corruption is done through political
connections. Therefore, the anti-corruption campaign is a good natural experiment to examine the
effects on the listed firms in China. Finally, there are SOEs and Non-SOEs in China; the former
are owned and normally run by governments while the latter have less relationship with
governments. They thus have very different situations. SOEs are known to have overinvestment
problem, in contrast, Non-SOEs face financial constraints and in turn, underinvestment problem.
This anti-corruption campaign offers a natural experiment since it is an exogenous shock, and thus
the association between the campaign and firm investment efficiency is free from an endogeneity
problem.
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This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study complements stock price
reaction literature such as Ke et al. (2016), Lin et al. (2017) and Liu et al. (2017). Stock price
response incorporates investors’ perceptions around event dates, however, the expectation may not
be the future reality itself. This study analyzes the possible changes in corporate investment
behavior after the campaign to shed light on the real effect of the campaign on all types of firms,
including SOEs and Non-SOEs with political connections. Second, this research extends the work
of Pan et al. (2017) who identify 104 politically connected firms that are involved in the corruption
cases (bribing firms). In this study we test the campaign effect with a much broader sample,
including all Chinese listed firms originally. The findings show the campaign effect on the whole
Chinese stock markets rather than only the effect on the event firms involved in the corruption
cases. Third, this study extends the literature on political connection-investment efficiency
relation. Previous research such as Chen et al. (2011a) and Xu et al. (2011) investigate the relation
between political connection and investment efficiency and this study documents that this relation
could be changed by exogenous factors such as anti-corruption campaign. Fourth, this study tries
to clarify if the anti-campaign effect is the whole stock market phenomenon or only the firms with
politically connected independent directors are affected. By doing so, it sheds light on the channels
through which the campaign influences the relation between political connection and investment
efficiency. Fifth, this study complements Fan (2016), Ye and Li (2017) as well as Tang et al.
(2016), who all investigate the stock price response of the loss of politically connected directors,
by examining the influence of the change in political independent directors on investment
behavior. Finally, the findings of this research demonstrate the impact of the campaign, that is,
whether the campaign really works to change something of Chinese listed firms or not. This is
critical and intriguing since the institutions, regulations and laws all almost remain the same, and
can only cutting off the political connections lead Chinese listed firms to the right way? We address
this issue.
We have organized the remainder of this paper as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical
results and discussion. Section 5 is devoted to robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the study and
offers suggestions.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1. Political connections in China
Political connections are prevalent, especially in emerging economies where the government still
controls over firms’ access to financial resources and investment projects (Liu et al., 2016). NonSOEs in China encounter a disadvantage relative to SOEs (Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012). Political
connections, therefore, help firms operating in weak institutional environments overcome market
and institutional obstacles and pursue favorable treatment from the government (Li et al. 2008;
Wu et al. 2012). As a result, Non-SOEs have the incentives to deal with these unfavorable
treatments by establishing political connections.
Political connection could lead firms to have both costs and benefits. For Non-SOEs the benefits
include better access to capital markets such as gaining bank loans and issuing stocks at favorable
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rates (Chan, Dang and Yan, 2012), political ties make Non-SOEs be able to secure contracts with
the government and its affiliated parties, including capital financing, operational contracts and
even direct subsidies (Hung, Wong and Zhang, 2015). Moreover, with political experience,
politically connected directors could contribute experience and information or help firms cope with
government affairs legally. Wu, Wu and Rui (2012) claim that Non-SOEs politically connected
managers try to obtain favorable treatment from the government, thereby increasing their firm
value.
In contrast, politically connected managers for SOEs have to achieve social-economic goals such
as decreasing unemployment rate and increasing local GDP rather than to maximizing firm value.
Furthermore, it is unnecessary for SOEs to build political connections for favorable treatment from
governments (Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012). Government ownership brings disadvantages to SOEs,
especially for local SOEs, because their controlling shareholders are local governments. To reach
social and political objectives such as lower unemployment rate and higher regional GDP, local
governments can powerfully get involved in SOEs’ operations (Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012). In China,
governments have influence over appointing SOEs’ key executives and the ability to secure bank
loans, access to equity markets or even state subsidies (DeFond et al. 2000; Fan et al. 2008; Wang
et al. 2008; Hung et al. 2012; Hung, Wong and Zhang, 2015). Moreover, connected firms are found
to be less efficient than unconnected counterparts (Chan, Dang and Yan, 2012), significantly
decreasing investment efficiency for SOEs (Chen et al., 2011b; Fan, 2016) and losing
independence from governments (Marquis and Qian, 2013). In contrast, central SOEs mainly keep
control over key industries and guarantee national economy safety rather than pursue political
objectives (Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012).
In summary, political connections bring Non-SOEs benefits which are greater than the costs while
for SOEs, the costs for political connections may be greater than the benefits, especially for local
SOEs.
2.2. Anti-corruption campaign, political connections and investment behavior
The campaign may destroy political connections and harm politically connected firms’ future
opportunities to contract with the government and thus losing the benefits related to these contracts
(Hung, Wong and Zhang, 2015). After the campaign, corruption-related firms may lose their
connections with the corrupt bureaucrats, and this may hurt the connection-related benefits. Lin et
al. (2017) note that the reforms are expected to prevent influential officials and all top party cadres
from demanding bribes for removing regulations which hamper market mechanisms and also harm
Non-SOEs from investing in “connections” with officials to “get things done”. However, the
effects of the campaign may vary depending on the ownership type. For SOEs, they are originally
politically-connected due to the high government ownership, it may not be necessary for them to
build political connections and even when they have political connections, these connections may
not bring additional benefits to SOEs but lead to higher costs related to lowering unemployment
rate and enhancing local GDP, which cause lower investment efficiency. After the campaign, if
the political connections are lessened, the connected SOEs’ investment efficiency may be
improved.
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In contrast, for Non-SOEs, before the campaign, politically-connected firms negotiate government
contracts and preferential treatment more easily (Boubakri et al., 2012), however, the benefits
could disappear as these firms lose their connections after the campaign. Xu et al. (2013) argue
that political connections help a firm reduce financial friction and obtain more external resources
at a lower cost, which can mitigate the underinvestment problem. When the campaign took effect,
however, Non-SOE politically-connected firms may lose this connection and also the related
benefits. We therefore hypothesize:
H1: After the anti-corruption campaign, Chinese politically connected Non-SOEs (PC Non-SOEs)
have lower investment efficiency than that before the campaign.
H2: After the anti-corruption campaign, Chinese politically connected SOEs (PC SOEs) have
higher investment efficiency than that before the campaign.
After the campaign, political connections may be destroyed, as a result, for PC SOEs, they may
assume less pressure to achieve socio-economic objectives such as increasing local GDP, leading
to less severe overinvestment, in turn lowering investment expenditures. In addition, for PC NonSOEs, their investment expenditures may also decrease because they may lose political
connections and the advantages resulting from the connection. This study thus hypothesizes:
H3: After the anti-corruption campaign, Chinese politically connected firms have lower investment
expenditures than that before.
2.3. Anti-corruption, independent directors and investment behavior
As previous research argues that independent directors play monitoring and consulting roles in
developed markets, however, in an institutional setting with weak investor protection and strong
government intervention, they may also play a political role. Ye and Li (2017) propose that
politically connected independent directors can build a bridge between firms and politicians,
helping firms to circumvent policy risks and secure regulatory rent. In China, the anti-corruption
regulation requires that former and incumbent government officers could serve as directors without
compensation or perquisites, only if the Organization Department authorizes (Xu, 2018). The
campaign seems to work as Xu (2018) finds that after the anti-corruption regulation was
implemented, from November 2013 to September 2014, the number of independent directors
resigned per month increased from 20 to more than 80, and then back to 50 and around one fourth
of independent directors’ resignations are due to the regulation. Tang et al. (2016) document, in
their research examining the impact of forced politically connected directors on firm value in
China, that firms with politically connected directors their stock prices drop significantly on the
announcements of the anti-corruption campaign and also of the resulting director resignation. Xu
(2018) reports that the channels through which the anti-corruption regulation hampers firm value
are believed to be financial constraints and government expropriation, and to follow the anticorruption regulation, firms could modify their board characteristics, investment as well as
operation policies. This research goes a step further to examine whether the campaign effects, if
any, mainly result from the possible loss of politically connected independent directors and
propose the following hypothesis:
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H4: After the anti-corruption campaign, PC Non-SOEs have lower investment efficiency resulting
from the resignation of politically connected directors.
H5: After the anti-corruption campaign, PC SOEs have higher investment efficiency resulting
from the resignation of politically connected directors.
H6: After the anti-corruption campaign, Chinese politically connected firms have lower
investment expenditures resulting from the resignation of politically connected directors.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data
This study examines the moderating effect of the anti-corruption campaign on the relation between
political connections and investment behavior by comparing the difference of investment
expenditures as well as investment efficiency before and after the anti-corruption campaign for
Chinese politically connected firms. Using Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and China Stock
Market and Accounting Research (hereafter, CSMAR) databases, this research collects data on
Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2016. Overall, the original sample includes 3,178 of Chinese
listed firms. Following previous studies, this research excludes firms in financial industries, since
their financial reports are different from those of other industries. This study also deletes firms
which have no financial data (missing information) in all the variables we need in this research.
This study uses a dummy variable, ANTI, to proxy for the anti-corruption campaign, which began
to be carried out by the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012
(Pan and Tian, 2017). To take ownership type into consideration, the overall sample is divided into
two groups, SOEs and Non-SOEs. Following Chen et al. (2011b), this study determines the nature
of ownership type from the annual report. A firm is classified as an SOE if it is ultimately
controlled by the government, including the central government, local governments at the
provincial, municipal, and county level, as well as other governmental institutions. A firm is
defined to be a Non-SOE when its ultimate controlling shareholder is an individual or a non-state
entity, such as a town–village enterprise, foreign enterprise, or other non-state-controlled
enterprises. This study manually collects background information about top executives from the
annual report disclosure contained in the CSMAR database.
To deal with outliers, this study firstly fills the missing data by means of each variable, then follows
Pan and Tian (2017) to winsorize those by 1% of top-and-bottom of all continuous variables. The
final sample in this study consists of 19,000 firm-years observations of 2,411 of Chinese listed
firms.
3.2 Research Design
To investigate the impact of the campaign on the investment behavior of Chinese listed firms,
following Pan and Tian (2017), Stein (2003), and Chen et al. (2011b), this study regresses
investment expenditures on Tobin’s Q and relevant control variables. The main variables in this
study are Tobin’s Q and ANTI. This study firstly investigates whether investment expenditures
and investment efficiency are affected by the campaign using model (1):
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INV , = α + α TQ , + α ANTI , + α TQ , ∗ ANTI , + α CFO , + α Lev , +
α Size , + α SALES , + α TANGI , + Firm fixed effects +
Year fixed effects + ε ,
(1)
Where the dependent variable INV is a firm's investment expenditures in a year. Following Chen
et al. (2011b) and Xu et al. (2011), INV is defined as cash payments for fixed assets, intangible
assets, and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement minus cash receipts from selling
these assets, scaled by the beginning total assets. In this study, TQ is a firm’s beginning-of-year
Tobin’s Q. Firms with more valuable investment opportunities are likely to invest more. TQ is
calculated as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities, divided by the sum of book value
of equity and liabilities. ANTI is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when the campaign
applied, and 0 for otherwise. The interaction term TQ*ANTI is added to capture the difference of
before and after anti-corruption applied in the investment efficiency of firms.
To be consistent with the literature (e.g. Chen et al., 2011b; Xu et al., 2013; Pan and Tian, 2017),
this study includes several control variables in the models. CFO is the ratio of firms’ operating
cash flows to total assets. Size is the log of firms’ total assets; Leverage (LEV) is the lagged one
time period ratio of firms’ total debt to total assets; Sales is the lagged one time period ratio of net
sales to total assets; and Tangibility (TANGI) is the ratio of tangible assets to firms’ total assets.
Finally, Firm and year fixed effects are also included. Moreover, to investigate whether Chinese
politically connected firms for both SOEs and Non-SOEs have different investment efficiency, the
overall sample is partitioned into SOEs and Non-SOEs two groups, then, each group is further
separated into politically connected and non-politically connected subgroups, respectively.
Finally, this study separately does analysis using model (2).
INV , = α + α TQ , + α ANTI , + α PC , + α TQ , ∗ ANTI , + α TQ , ∗ PC , +
α ANTI , ∗ PC , + α TQ , ∗ ANTI , ∗ PC , + α CFO , + α Lev ,
+ α Size , +
α SALES , + α TANGI , + Firm fixed effects + Year fixed effects + ε ,
(2)
Where SOE is a dummy variable, when comparing SOEs with Non-SOEs, SOE variable is stateowned enterprises, which is equal to one for SOEs and zero otherwise. PC is a proxy for a firm’s
political connections to the government. Following prior studies (Faccio, 2006, 2010; Xu et al.,
2013; Ma et al., 2013; Su et al., 2014), a firm is classified as politically connected if the
Chairperson, CEO or one of the board of directors is an ex- or current government bureaucrat, or
is a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) in which case it has a value of 1; zero otherwise. Thus, we use political
connection (PC) as a dummy variable, which equal to 1 for politically connected firms and 0 for
non-politically connected firms. TQ*ANTI*PC is the interaction among Tobin's Q, the anticorruption campaign, and PC. This research predicts (H1) that, for Non-SOEs subgroup, the
coefficient of TQ*ANTI*PC, α , is negative, suggesting that after the campaign, Chinese
politically connected Non-SOEs have lower investment efficiency than before the campaign. In
contrast, for SOEs subgroup, the coefficient of TQ*ANTI*PC, α , is expected to be positive (H2),
suggesting that after the campaign, PC SOEs have higher investment efficiency than before the
campaign. Finally, for SOEs subgroup, the coefficient of ANTI , , α , is expected to be negative
(H3), indicating that after the campaign, PC SOEs have lower investment expenditures than before.
Finally, to investigate the effect of politically connected director resignation on firm investment
behavior, this study separately does regression analysis using model (3).
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INV ,

= α + α TQ , + α ANTI , + α △ POLDIR , + α TQ , ∗ ANTI ,
+
α TQ , ∗ △ POLDIR , + α ANTI , ∗△ POLDIR , + α TQ ,
∗ △ POLDIR , + α CFO , + α Lev ,
+ α Size , + α SALES ,
+ α TANGI , + Firm fixed effects + Year fixed effects + ε ,

∗ ANTI ,

(3)
Where △ POLDIR , is the change in the number of politically connected independent directors or
the percentage of politically connected independent directors, equal to the number of politically
connected independent directors of year t minus the number of year t-1. For PC Non-SOEs, the
coefficient of TQ , ∗ ANTI , ∗△ POLDIR , , that is α , is expected to be negative (H4),
suggesting that after the campaign, PC Non-SOEs have lower investment efficiency resulting from
the loss of politically connected directors. In contrast, for politically-connected SOEs, the
coefficient is predicted to be positive, indicating that after the campaign, PC SOEs have higher
investment efficiency resulting from the loss of politically connected directors. Finally, for PC
SOEs, the coefficient of ANTI , ∗△ POLDIR , , α , is predicted to be negative, suggesting that
after the campaign, PC SOEs have lower investment expenditures resulting from the loss of
politically connected directors.
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and results of differences in mean analysis between PC NonSOEs and PC Central SOEs as well as PC Local SOEs (politically connected SOEs controlled by
local governments) before and after the campaign. It can be seen from the table that, compared
with the pre-anti period, all types of firms, including PC Non-SOEs, PC Central SOEs and PC
Local SOEs, have lower investment level and Tobin’s Q after the campaign, supporting Hypothesis
3 that after the campaign, Chinese politically connected firms have lower investment expenditures
than that before the campaign. In addition, debt ratio (Lev) decreases significantly for PC NonSOEs, however, it increases significantly for both PC Central SOEs and PC Local SOEs. This
implies that after the campaign, it should be more difficult for PC Non-SOEs to raise debt from
state-owned banks due to the loss of political connections compared with that before the campaign.
Finally, PC NSOEs have much lower sales after the campaign, the difference is negative and
significant at the 1% level while the sales for both PC Central SOEs and PC Local SOEs have little
change. It suggests that the campaign really negatively harms PC NSOEs’ operating activities.
In summary, the results suggest that the campaign does indeed affect Chinese politically connected
firms, in that all three types of firms have much lower investment expenditures and Tobin’s Q after
the campaign compared with that before the campaign. Furthermore, after the campaign, PC NonSOEs experience a significant reduction in financial leverage and sales, while both PC Central
SOEs and PC Local SOEs do not decrease or even increase. These results suggest that the
campaign lowers the investment opportunities and investment level for all Chinese politically
connected firms. In addition, the loss of political connections for Non-SOEs harms their abilities
to raise funds from state-owned banks and that of doing business with public institutions.
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Table 1. The Descriptive Statistics and the Differences in Mean and Median of Variables of PC Non-SOEs, PC Central SOEs and PC Local SOEs
PC Non-SOEs
Var.

Difference

Mean

N

PC SOEs Central

Median

Before

After

Before

After

t-value

N

z-value

Difference

Mean
Before

Median
After

Before

After

t-value

z-value

INV

6786

0.054

0.045

0.039

0.033

-6.577***

-5.505***

625

0.063

0.035

0.047

0.026

-6.915***

-4.152***

TQ

6786

2.893

1.855

1.836

1.301

-17.651***

-17.019***

625

2.344

1.300

1.656

0.990

-7.070***

-11.942***

CFO

6786

0.036

0.037

0.035

0.037

0.832

-1.170

625

0.046

0.036

0.046

0.036

-1.449

-3.445***

LEV

6786

0.525

0.467

0.496

0.461

-7.180***

-4.343***

625

0.529

0.587

0.547

0.590

2.702***

-3.639***

SIZE

6786

9.420

9.650

9.370

9.570

15.619***

-15.919***

625

9.850

10.020

9.660

9.910

2.515**

-9.590***

SALE

6786

0.696

0.631

0.573

0.503

-5.003***

-6.271***

625

0.798

0.806

0.661

0.683

0.150

-1.564

TANGI

6786

0.228

0.232

0.190

0.198

0.898

-1.168

625

0.274

0.228

0.214

0.170

-2.485**

-1.839*

PC SOEs Local
Var.

N

Difference

Mean

Median

Before

After

Before

After

t-value

z-value

INV

1121

0.058

0.048

0.041

0.033

-2.545**

-2.281**

TQ

1121

2.283

1.289

1.575

0.776

-7.288***

-10.521***

CFO

1121

0.054

0.037

0.054

0.035

-2.952***

-3.400***

LEV

1121

0.529

0.570

0.542

0.577

2.559**

-2.950***

SIZE

1121

9.600

9.970

9.570

9.960

9.586***

-9.258***

SALE

1121

0.701

0.641

0.580

0.535

-1.603

-0.929

TANGI

1121

0.299

0.285

0.276

0.253

-1.058

-1.181

*, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports the descriptive statistics and the differences in mean and median of variables of PC Non-SOEs, PC Central
SOEs and PC Local SOEs. SOEs are state-owned enterprises, while Non-SOEs are otherwise. PC SOEs Central is politically connected SOEs controlled by the central government while PC SOEs Local is politically
connected SOEs controlled by local governments. INV is defined as cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement minus cash receipts from selling these assets,
scaled by the beginning total assets. TQ is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities, divided by the sum of book value of equity and liabilities. This study includes several control variables in the
models. CFO is the ratio of firms’ operating cash flows to total assets. Size is the log of firms’ total assets; Leverage (LEV) is the lagged one time period ratio of firms’ total debt to total assets; Sales is the lagged one
time period ratio of net sales to total assets; and Tangibility (TANGI) is the ratio of tangible assets to firms’ total assets.
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4.2 The effect of the campaign on the investment behavior of politically connected firms
Table 2 shows the regression results for the effect of the campaign on the investment behavior of
different ownership types. As can be seen from the table, all coefficients on ANTI are negative
and significant at the 1% level from Column I to Column IV, indicating that the investment level
of all types of firms significantly decreases after the campaign. This result is consistent with the
finding in Table 1 and supports our Hypothesis 3 that after the campaign, Chinese politically
connected firms have lower investment expenditures than that before the campaign. Regarding the
influence of the campaign on investment efficiency, Column I shows that the coefficient on
TQ*ANTI is positive but insignificant at conventional levels. When the SOEs are divided into
Central SOEs and Local SOEs, the coefficient on TQ*ANTI is insignificant at conventional levels
for Central SOEs while that for Local SOEs is positive and significant at the 5% level. This result
suggests that after the campaign, the investment efficiency of PC SOEs has little change, however,
that of Local SOEs is enhanced, implying that Local SOEs benefits more than Central SOEs in
investment efficiency from the campaign. This finding partially supports our Hypothesis 2 that
after the campaign, Chinese politically connected SOEs have higher investment efficiency than
that before the campaign. Finally, Column IV shows that the coefficient on TQ*ANTI is positive
and significant at the 5% level, indicating an increase in investment efficiency for Non-SOEs after
the campaign. This result is not consistent with our Hypothesis 1, one possible reason is that after
the campaign, Non-SOEs overinvest less due to the difficulty to raise funds from state-owned
banks or they make investment decisions more cautiously due to the loss of political connections,
thereby mitigating the overinvestment problem.
Table 2. The Effect of the Campaign on the Investment Behavior of Politically Connected Firms
VARIABLE

I
SOE

II
SOE-Central

III
SOE-Local

IV
Non-SOE

C

0.0080
(0.1236)
0.0015**
(2.0435)
-0.0241***
(-5.4503)
0.0032
(1.3708)
0.0010
(0.0591)
-0.0416***
(-4.6218)
0.0106
(1.6159)
-0.0017
(-0.3597)
-0.1127***
(-7.6049)

0.1369
(1.2095)
0.0006
(0.4587)
-0.0244***
(-3.4150)
-0.0016
(-0.4784)
0.0224
(0.8121)
-0.0219
(-1.3169)
-0.0010
(-0.0847)
-0.0183**
(-2.3226)
-0.1564***
(-5.1604)

0.0707
(0.6787)
0.0014
(1.2730)
-0.0267***
(-4.0338)
0.0090**
(2.3585)
-0.0064
(-0.2600)
-0.0449***
(-3.6655)
0.0046
(0.4260)
0.0078
(1.1807)
-0.1382***
(-6.7385)

0.0369
(1.1530)
0.0004
(1.0860)
-0.0207***
(-10.3565)
0.0016**
(2.4729)
0.0265***
(2.9915)
-0.0364***
(-10.9569)
0.0057*
(1.7050)
-0.0029
(-1.0604)
-0.0738**
(-8.8705)

TQ
ANTI
TQ*ANTI
CFO
LEV
SIZE
SALE
TANGI
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Table 2 (continued)
Cross-section fixed
(dummy variables)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
N

0.7126
0.5407
4.1450***
1895

0.7880
0.6478
5.6181***
566

0.7183
0.5085
3.4230***
1027

0.5972
0.4652
4.5237***
5765

*, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports the
effect of the campaign on the investment behavior of politically connected firms. INV is defined as cash payments for
fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement minus cash receipts from selling
these assets, scaled by the beginning total assets. ANTI is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when the
campaign applied, and 0 for otherwise. TQ is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities, divided
by the sum of book value of equity and liabilities. The interaction term TQ*ANTI is added to capture the difference
of before and after anti-corruption applied in the investment efficiency of firms. This study includes several control
variables in the models. CFO is the ratio of firms’ operating cash flows to total assets. Size is the log of firms’ total
assets; Leverage (LEV) is the lagged one time period ratio of firms’ total debt to total assets; Sales is the lagged one
time period ratio of net sales to total assets; and Tangibility (TANGI) is the ratio of tangible assets to firms’ total
assets. Finally, Firm and year fixed effects are also included. T-statistics (t-value) are reported in parentheses.

4.3 The effect of the campaign on the investment behavior of politically-connected and nonpolitically connected firms – a Difference-in-Differences test.
Even though the anti-corruption campaign is an exogenous shock which causes little endogeneity
problem, we still use difference-in-differences method to deal with this issue. The results are
reported in Table 36. Columns I to IV show that the coefficients on ANTI are all negative and
significant at the 1% level except that of Non-SOEs. In addition, the coefficients on ANTI*SOE
_PC, ANTI*SOE CENTRAL_PC, ANTI*SOE LOCAL_PC and ANTI*NON-SOE_PC are all
positive and not significant at conventional levels. These results indicate that after the campaign,
all types of firms experience decreased investment expenditures, and there is little difference
between those with and without political connections. One possible reason is that this campaign
negatively impacts on Chinese firms widely.
Regarding the effect of the campaign on investment efficiency of Chinese listed firms, as can be
seen from Columns I and II of the table, the coefficients on both TQ*ANTI and
TQ*ANTI*SOE_PC as well as those on both TQ*ANTI and TQ*ANTI*SOE CEN_PC are all
insignificant at conventional levels, however, Column III shows that the coefficients on TQ*ANTI
and TQ*ANTI*SOE LOC_PC are both positive with the latter significant at the 5% level. This
result suggests that the campaign does not affect the investment efficiency of Central SOEs,
whether they are politically connected or not. In addition, the investment efficiency of Local SOEs
without political connections is not influenced by the campaign, however, that of politically
connected Local SOEs is enhanced after the campaign. Finally, the investment efficiency of NonSOEs is improved after the campaign, whether they are politically connected or not, and the

6

To save space, only the results of the key variables are shown in the table.
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difference of the investment efficiency enhancement is not significant between those with and
without political connections.
In summary, the campaign causes a widely and significantly lower investment expenditure, all
firms experience a great reduction in investment level. In addition, the investment efficiency of
PC Local SOEs is improved and that of all Non-SOEs is enhanced and the enhancement shows no
difference between PC Non-SOEs and NPC Non-SOEs (not politically connected Non-SOEs).
Table 3. Difference-in-Differences Analysis
VARIABLE
ANTI
ANTI*SOE _PC

I
SOEs
-0.0322***
(-3.2341)
0.0078
(0.8417)

ANTI*SOE CENTRAL_PC

II
SOEs-Central
-0.0320***
(-4.6849)

III
SOEs-Local
-0.0259***
(-3.5825)

0.0081
(0.8164)

ANTI*SOE LOCAL_PC

0.0005
(0.0467)

ANTI*NON-SOE_PC
TQ*ANTI
TQ*ANTI*SOE_PC

IV
Non-SOEs
-0.0081
(-0.1028)

-0.0009
(-0.2829)
0.0027
(0.4644)

0.0020
(0.6488)

TQ*ANTI*SOE CEN_PC

0.0024
(0.6178)

0.0006
(1.1958)
0.0016**
(2.5185)

-0.0050
(-1.1272)

TQ*ANTI*SOE LOC_PC

0.0142**
(2.1066)

TQ*ANTI*NON-SOE_PC

0.0008
(1.1811)

*, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports
Difference-in-Differences Analysis. ANTI is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when the campaign applied,
and 0 for otherwise. SOE is state-owned enterprises, while Non-SOE is otherwise. SOE_PC is politically connected
SOEs. SOE Central/Cen_PC is politically connected SOEs controlled by the central government while SOE
Local/Loc_PC is politically connected SOEs controlled by local governments. TQ is calculated as the sum of market
value of equity and liabilities, divided by the sum of book value of equity and liabilities. The interaction term
TQ*ANTI is added to capture the difference of before and after anti-corruption applied in the investment efficiency
of firms. TQ*ANTI*SOE is the interaction among TQ, ANTI, and SOE. This study includes several control variables
in the models. CFO is the ratio of firms’ operating cash flows to total assets. Size is the log of firms’ total assets;
Leverage (LEV) is the lagged one time period ratio of firms’ total debt to total assets; Sales is the lagged one time
period ratio of net sales to total assets; and Tangibility (TANGI) is the ratio of tangible assets to firms’ total assets.
Finally, Firm and year fixed effects are also included. T-statistics (t-value) are reported in parentheses.
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4.4 The effect of the change in politically connected independent directors on the investment
behavior of politically connected firms.
Here we investigate the influence of this regulation on investment behavior. We focus only on the
firms with politically connected independent directors (POLDIR) and classify the firms into three
groups – Central SOEs POLDIR, Local SOEs POLDIR and Non-SOEs POLDIR. Table 4 presents
the results. As can be seen from Column I to Column VI, coefficients on ANTI are all negative
and significant at the 1% level, indicating that after the campaign, the investment expenditures are
much lower than those before the campaign for all types of firms with politically connected
independent directors. The coefficients on TQ*ANTI in Columns I and III are both positive and
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the investment efficiency of SOEs increases after the
campaign and this enhancement of investment efficiency is due to the Local SOEs. In addition,
the coefficient on TQ*ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_ PER is positive and significant at the 5% level,
as shown in Column I, indicating that after the campaign, the decrease in politically connected
independent directors causes lower investment efficiency for SOEs. Furthermore, the coefficients
on both TQ*ANTI*SOECENPC_POLDIR_ PER and TQ*ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_ PER
are positive, as shown in Columns I and III, respectively, indicating that the investment efficiency
of SOEs controlled both by the central government and by local governments decreases after the
campaign. However, they are not significant at conventional levels. Finally, Column IV reports
that the coefficients on ANTI*POLDIR_ PER and TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_ PER are positive and
negative, respectively, both are significant at or better than the 10% level. This finding suggests
that after the campaign, for Non-SOEs, the decrease in politically connected independent directors
leads to decreased investment expenditures, but it causes enhanced investment efficiency.
Table 4. The Effect of the Change in Politically Connected Independent Directors on Investment
Behavior of Politically Connected Firms
VARIABLE

I
SOEs

II
III
IV
SOEs-Central SOEs-Local Non-SOEs

C

-0.0004
(-0.0049)
TQ
-0.0012
(-0.9752)
ANTI
-0.0242***
(-5.9947)
TQ*ANTI
0.0052***
(2.7975)
SOEPC_POLDIR_PER
0.0027
(1.0682)
TQ*SOEPC_POLDIR_ PER
-0.0012
(-0.6785)
ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_ PER
-0.0134*
(-1.7662)
TQ*ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_ PER 0.0054**
(2.2059)
SOELOCPC_POLDIR_ PER
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0.1217
(1.0239)
-0.0015
(-0.7684)
-0.0259***
(-4.3302)
0.0020
(0.6063)

0.1776
(1.1467)
-0.0023
(-1.0784)
-0.0193***
(-2.9346)
0.0087***
(2.8423)

0.0073
(0.8947)

0.0823**
(2.4198)
0.0017***
(3.3278)
-0.0145***
(-8.2307)
0.0005
(0.8876)
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Table 4 (continued)
TQ*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_ PER

-0.0008
(-0.3192)
-0.0165
(-1.3687)

ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_ PER
TQ*ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_
PER

0.0049
(1.4195)

SOECENPC_POLDIR_ PER

0.0079
(1.0849)
0.0016
(0.4385)
-0.0086
(-0.7919)

TQ*SOECENPC_POLDIR_ PER
ANTI*SOECENPC_POLDIR_ PER
TQ*ANTI*SOECENPC_POLDIR_
PER

0.0006
(0.1141)

POLDIR_ PER

-0.0033
(-1.1078)
0.0015
(1.4321)
0.0081**
(2.0929)

TQ*POLDIR_ PER
ANTI*POLDIR_ PER
Table 4 (continued)
TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_ PER
Control Variables
Cross-section
variables)

Yes
fixed

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
N

Yes

Yes

-0.0024*
(-1.6836)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.8067
0.6766
6.1982***
416

0.7281
0.5372
3.8126***
682

0.6172
0.4940
5.0106***
5547

(dummyYes
0.7212
0.5616
4.5189***
1358

*, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports the
effect of the change in politically connected independent directors on investment behavior of politically connected
firms. ANTI is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when the campaign applied, and 0 for otherwise. SOE is
state-owned enterprises, while Non-SOE is otherwise. SOEPC is politically connected SOEs.
SOECENPC_POLDIR_PER is politically connected independent directors SOEs controlled by the central
government while SOELOCPC_POLDIR_PER is politically connected independent directors SOEs controlled by
local governments. TQ is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities, divided by the sum of book
value of equity and liabilities. The interaction term TQ*ANTI is added to capture the difference of before and after
anti-corruption applied in the investment efficiency of firms. POLDIR_PER is the percentage of politically connected
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independent directors. TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_PER is the interaction among TQ, ANTI, and POLDIR_PER. Finally,
Firm and year fixed effects are also included. T-statistics (t-value) are reported in parentheses.

Overall, the results in Table 1 to Table 4 indicate that the campaign does have an impact on
investment behavior. After the campaign, all types of firms, whether they are politically connected
or not, experience a significant reduction in investment expenditures. In addition, the investment
efficiency for both PC Local SOEs and PC Non-SOEs is improved. Finally, the investment
efficiency for both PC Local SOEs and PC Non-SOEs is enhanced after the campaign.
5. Robustness tests
5.1 An alternative proxy for the influence of politically connected independent directors
In the last section, we use the change in the number of politically connected independent directors
to examine the effect of Regulation No. 18 on investment behavior. Here, another proxy – the total
number of politically connected independent directors– is utilized to investigate the campaign
effect from another aspect. The results are reported in Table 5. As can be seen from Column I, the
coefficient on ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM is negative and significant at the 10% level,
indicating that after the campaign, the number of politically connected independent directors is
negatively related to investment expenditures for SOEs. One possible reason is that after the
campaign, politically independent directors put less pressure on Local SOEs to overinvest. In
addition, the coefficient on TQ*ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM is positive and significant at the
5% level, suggesting that after the campaign, a higher number of politically independent directors
leads to better investment efficiency, and this effect is mainly due to the Local SOEs, as is
evidenced by the positive and significant (at the 10% level) coefficient on
TQ*ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM. Furthermore, Column IV shows that the coefficient on
ANTI*POLDIR_SUM is positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating that after the
campaign, for Non-SOEs, politically connected independent directors induce more investment
expenditures. Finally, the coefficient on TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_SUM is negative and significant at
the 10% level, suggesting that after the campaign, for Non-SOEs, lower number of politically
connected independent directors leads to higher investment efficiency.
Table 5. The Effect of the Number of Politically Connected Independent Directors on Investment
Behavior
VARIABLE

I
SOEs

II
SOEs-Central

III
SOEs-Local

IV
Non-SOEs

C

-0.0174
(-0.2340)
-0.0003
(-0.2557)
-0.0225***
(-6.2311)
0.0045**
(2.7328)
0.0027
(1.0682)
-0.0008
(-0.8317)

0.1351
(1.1179)
-0.0010
(-0.4925)
-0.0223***
(-3.9653)
-0.0001
(-0.0268)

0.1913*
(1.8206)
-0.0006
(-0.4151)
-0.0157**
(-2.4413)
0.0061***
(2.9572)

0.0686**
(2.1506)
0.0015***
(3.1687)
-0.0153***
(-9.1739)
0.0006
(1.019)

TQ
ANTI
TQ*ANTI
SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM
TQ*SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM
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Table 5 (continued)
ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM
TQ*ANTI*SOEPC_POLDIR_SUM

-0.0073*
(-1.8048)
0.0032**
(1.9940)

SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM

0.0051
(1.4687)
-0.0008
(-0.5882)
-0.0122**
(-2.314)
0.0038*
(1.7812)

TQ*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM
ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM
TQ*ANTI*SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM
SOECENPC_POLDIR_SUM

-0.0008
(-0.2001)
0.0023
(0.9294)
0.0024
(0.3881)
-0.0021
(-0.6257)

TQ*SOECENPC_POLDIR_SUM
ANTI*SOECENPC_POLDIR_SUM
TQ*ANTI*SOECENPC_POLDIR_SUM
POLDIR_SUM

Control Variables
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

-0.0010
(-0.6945)
0.0003
(0.6731)
0.0035*
(1.7276)
-0.0014*
(-1.8099)
Yes
Yes

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
N

0.7141
0.5579
4.5700***
1512

0.7915
0.6570
5.8858***
455

0.7274
0.5502
4.1041***
765

0.6123
0.4960
5.2642***
6129

TQ*POLDIR_SUM
ANTI*POLDIR_SUM
TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_SUM

*, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports the
effect of the change in politically connected independent directors on investment behavior of politically connected
firms. ANTI is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when the campaign applied, and 0 for otherwise. SOE is
state-owned enterprises, while Non-SOE is otherwise. SOEPC is politically connected SOEs.
SOECENPC_POLDIR_SUM is politically connected independent directors SOEs controlled by the central
government while SOELOCPC_POLDIR_SUM is politically connected independent directors SOEs controlled by
local governments. TQ is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities, divided by the sum of book
value of equity and liabilities. The interaction term TQ*ANTI is added to capture the difference of before and after
anti-corruption applied in the investment efficiency of firms. POLDIR_SUM is the change in the number of politically
connected independent directors.
TQ*ANTI*POLDIR_SUM is the interaction among TQ, ANTI, and
POLDIR_SUM. Finally, Firm and year fixed effects are also included. T-statistics (t-value) are reported in
parentheses.

5.2 An alternative way to measure investment efficiency
We use a model to predict a firm’s investment efficiency, following Wang, Zhu and Hoffmire
(2015). We then take the residuals, which represent the deviations from predicted investment, from
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the model to proxy for investment inefficiency. A positive residual is classified as overinvestment
while a negative deviation is assigned as underinvestment. Finally, to determine how the campaign
affects the investment efficiency of Chinese politically connected firms, we regress the residuals
on ANTI for positive and negative groups, respectively. The results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6. The Effect of The Anti-Corruption Campaign on Overinvestment and Underinvestment Problems

VARIABLE
Panel A: SOEs
ANTI
Panel B: SOEs-Central
ANTI
Panel C: SOEs-Local
ANTI
Panel D: Non-SOEs
ANTI

(I) Overinvestment

(II) Underinvestment

-0.0018 (-0.5467)

0.0022(1.2543)

-0.0106**(-2.1342)

0.0016(0.5292)

-0.0037(-0.7021)

0.0043*(1.9218

-0.0031**(-2.2762)

0.0025***(2.9130)

*, **, *** represent significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % 1 % levels (2-tailed), respectively. This table reports The
effect of the anti-corruption campaign on overinvestment and underinvestment problems. ANTI is a dummy variable
equal to 1 for the period when the campaign applied, and 0 for otherwise. SOEs are state-owned enterprises, while
Non-SOEs are otherwise. SOEs-Central is SOEs controlled by the central government. SOEs-Local is SOEs controlled
by the local government T-statistics (t-value) are reported in parentheses.

The results show that, on average, the anti-corruption campaign implemented in China does affect
the investment behavior of Chinese listed firm. After the campaign, all types of firms encounter
great reduction in investment level. In addition, PC Local SOEs experience better investment
efficiency due to the mitigated underinvestment and PC Non-SOEs have improved investment
efficiency because of their less severe under- and over-investment.
Taken together, the results of the robustness checks in this study reveal that our main findings are
robust to alternative proxies and difference-in-differences test.
5. CONCLUSION AND SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This research empirically analyzes the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on the investment
behavior of Chinese politically connected firms. We hypothesize that the campaign may lead to
lower investment expenditures for all types of politically connected firms and cause enhancement
of investment efficiency for politically connected SOEs while that of Non-SOEs may be harmed.
The findings of this paper on average support our hypotheses and demonstrate the impact of the
campaign on the investment behavior of Chinese politically connected firms. However, one result
is intriguing, that is, after the campaign, the investment efficiency of PC Non-SOEs is better than
that before the campaign. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis1, which we predict a lower
investment efficiency after the campaign. We find, from our robustness test that, this enhancement
of investment efficiency is due to the mitigation of both under- and over-investment. This may be
because it becomes more difficult for PC Non-SOEs to raise funds externally when losing political
connections so that they make investment decisions more cautiously, thereby mitigating
overinvestment problem. In addition, after the campaign, the investment opportunities of Chinese
stock markets reduce sharply, leading to much lower underinvestment for PC Non-SOEs.
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Political connections are pervasive, especially in emerging markets. Researchers are encouraged
to examine the influence of political connections on corporate policy in common, and on financial
policy, in particular, to shed more light on the impact of these connections on capital market
development.
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